I hope everyone's got a drink in their hand.
I'm going to sit right here next to my face.
What's up? How's it going, Lugano?
We're going to be talking about Bitcoin custody, which is the most important decision you can make in your Bitcoin journey.
I have good friend John Carvalho here, who will come up here and sit right next to me.
I got Jameson Lopp, who's going to come sit right here.
We have Schwartz from Spectre, who's going to sit next to Jameson.
And then we have Luca from Bitbox, who's going to sit next to Schwartz.
Can we get a huge round of applause for Luca?
Specifically Luca.
30 minutes on the clock starts now.
So I would, I think there's like, if you're going to break down Bitcoin custody, there's two different ways to break it down.
And it's individual custody and then it's corporate custody.
And then you could probably break down corporate custody to small businesses versus large organizations.
I want to start with individual custody and we'll push it over to my good friend John over here.
When you talk to someone, you've been in Bitcoin for over a decade now.
When you talk to someone who's just getting into Bitcoin, they're thinking about Bitcoin custody for their individual, how do you talk to them about it?
John?
I'm not sure it starts that way.
I mean, people come to you talking about Bitcoin.
They're usually wanting to understand how it works, how it might help them.
The custody part, I don't know.
I've been pretty far away from any sort of orange pilling.
So I'm not really somebody that is like an evangelist, but I would say, you know, ultimately I would end up sending them to something that would make them want to self-custody and probably explain to them the idea of keeping something cold versus keeping something hot.
So, I mean, you're building the BitKit wallet, right, which is a user-focused wallet for probably mostly newcomers, right, or like end users.
So, like when you think about building BitKit, what are the fundamentals that you think about?
Okay, you have a mobile wallet, you're receiving Bitcoin maybe for your first time, maybe not, maybe you're an experienced user at that point, but like how are you thinking about like the defaults and how you build out that wallet?
In BitKit wallet, we're doing our best to meet the customer where they're at, meet the user where they're at, and assume that users aren't really at where most Bitcoiners think they are.
Like, in other words, not as technical as the enthusiasts and everything like this, and so we make a special effort to try to mask complexity as best as we can.
And so there is a lightning node in our wallet, and so the complexity that it supports is pretty severe, and hiding the complexity of lightning takes a lot of work.
And so, yeah, a lot of the work that we've put in in making the BitKit wallet over the past years has been simply hiding the complexity from the user, so the wallet feels more comfortable with something like what they would normally use.
So, yeah.
That makes sense.
That makes sense to me.
We got Jameson over here.
Jameson, you probably, with Casa, you probably deal with more like high net worth individuals, wealthy folk.
Like, when you think about, like, building, oh, do we not have enough microphones?
Are we passing microphones?
Yeah.
All right, you guys are passing microphones.
I'm just going to hold on to mine.
Do we agree with this?
Do we all?
Okay.
When you think about building Casa, like, how do you, I think defaults probably matter, but it's also, is it like a white glove?
Are you, like, talking to the user as you're bringing them into Bitcoin?
Yeah, I mean, it depends on the user and their service level, right?
I mean, we have more of a do-it-yourself tier, but it's still really focused on, I generally say, like, whole coiners and above.
Like, if you have a significant portion of your net worth in Bitcoin, that's when Casa starts to make sense.
I look at custody as several different tiers.
First of all, there's tier zero.
You don't have Bitcoin.
You have Bitcoin IOUs because the keys are held by some third party.
Next tier is you have a hot wallet.
So, you know, maybe you have a mobile app or desktop app.
The keys are on there.
So, at least you're getting rid of third-party risk, but you're still exposed to hackers and, you know, all the dangerous stuff on the Internet.
Beyond that, you're at least taking your keys offline, so you're buying cold.
Card, Ledger, Trezor, whatever, any reputable hardware device, and it's the tier beyond that when Casa starts to come into play.
That's where, you know, you've already mitigated most of the risks of attack, and you have to be worried more about shooting yourself in the foot.
Like, locking yourself out of your keys.
So, eliminating single points of failure, doing that by putting in a lot of redundancy, and that's where things like multi-sig and using multiple different hardware vendors to prevent things like supply chain attacks.
And think about all of these edge cases, because if you're keeping the majority of your net worth in Bitcoin, then you need to make sure that there is no single thing that can happen that will just be a catastrophic loss.
Yeah, I mean, I think most people lose their Bitcoin.
They don't have their Bitcoin stolen from them.
And I think...
That's a good point.
I think influencers tend to overestimate the theft risk versus loss, which is probably where more of the focus should be, is on not messing up your own custody setup.
I'm going to jump to Luca over there.
Luca Bitbox is one of the more popular hardware wallets.
How do you guys think about self-custody?
And specifically, how do you guys think about more top-of-the-funnel self-custody?
Like, I think a lot of new people that are entering the space are coming in through an MSTR or maybe an ETF or something.
At Bitbox, how are you guys thinking about bringing more people into actual real Bitcoin, holding self-custody real Bitcoin?
Well, I think there are two different aspects here.
From one side, like, there is the communication, the education that a company can do to actually teach the people, like, why it is important to, like, to do self-custody,
to be in, like, to have your own private keys, to be independent from third parties.
And the other side of the story is being able to give a product that can help an experienced user to do it, which is one of the main focus of our product.
So, the Bitbox and the Bitbox app, they are really designed in a way that tries to be as simple as possible, as also John was saying before, like, hiding the technology from the user every time that it is possible.
But also, like, gives the opportunity for more tech-savvy users to access, like, more, like, technical features.
So, yeah, instruction from one side, like, teaching the importance of self-custody on one side.
And on the other side, as Jameson was saying, like, that the most, that the highest reason to lose your coins in self-custody is shooting your foot.
So, like, having a simple product is definitely an added value.
So, I would think that, of course, you should start with, like, a simple solution for your Bitcoin.
But then there's some time where you need to upgrade your security, and then maybe you don't want to have, like, if you are, like, having, like, a medium stack and not very, very high so that it doesn't make...
Like, what does that mean?
So, if it doesn't make economically sense to maybe, like, have a, like, have, like, casa where you have, like, huge amounts and, like, have a...
But that's the hard part, right?
Like, what is a huge amount?
Yeah, it's for every person.
It's, like, different, of course.
Is it a percentage of your net worth or is it a percentage of savings?
So, it's not if you're, like, poor, then you don't...
Raise your hand if you're poor.
Okay.
So, like, half the crowd needs poor advice.
Yeah, so, of course, if you're, like, if you don't have enough money, then it doesn't make sense to have, like, the huge security setup.
But if you have, like, a decent amount of money in Bitcoin, then it makes, at some point, doesn't make sense to, like, use the simple Bitbox solution, what you're currently using.
So, maybe, like, just the Bitbox with the PIN code and the backup.
Then there is, like, the point where you need to decide if you do make a passphrase or, like, multisig.
This is, like, most of what I'm thinking.
And, yeah, of course, then if you decide for the multisig route, then you can even get, like, some extra, maybe, like, doing multiple vendors or, yeah, some special multisig where you have, like, an extra cosigner or...
I don't know, but I think that's, like, the route.
So, you start, often you start with a Bitbox because you want to get rid of your money laying on your exchange.
And then you need to, like, start having, like, most people start with a passphrase.
And, yeah, there is, like, where most people, like, get a Spectre because there you can, like, it's easier to type in your passphrase, for example.
Do you think, do you think, so, I mean, I think the cool part about Spectre is that you can build it yourself, that it's actually open hardware, that you're not buying, you know, a hardware device for a company.
Do you think most people that use a Spectre are using it in a single-sig type of situation, or are they using it in combination with other hardware devices?
So, they are using both, but I think most of Spectre users are, like, a little bit more advanced than the Bitbox users.
And...
Yeah, I think you're automatically more advanced if you get to the Spectre stage.
I think it's pretty safe to say that, right?
I think most of them are, like, more advanced than the users that start with the Bitbox, yes.
And then I think they, at this stage, they are, like, deciding if, okay, do I want to make multisig?
Do I want to make a passphrase, or maybe they just, like, build a safe Spectre or a buyer Spectre, and then they, like, having in mind that they need to change their security setup in maybe a couple of years when the Bitcoin price rises.
So, while I have multiple people on here with strong opinions, and you kind of, I would like to do Q&A at some, we'll do Q&A at the end.
I would like to do Q&A at the end.
Also, I've decided to scrap corporate custody.
We're only talking about individual...
Does anyone here own a business?
Okay, so some of the poor people own businesses.
Consider making your businesses profitable.
We're going to talk about individual custody only.
I want to talk about multisig versus single sig, because I think a lot of the recommendations lately have been, if you're going to self-custody, you have to figure out multisig.
But I'm not sure if that's necessarily the case.
I have John next to me.
He has very strong opinions.
John, when you talk to someone and they ask you, single sig versus multisig, how do you handle that conversation?
Do you have this...
You must have this conversation.
Literally, no one has ever asked me that.
How many people here have used multisig?
There we go.
Look, more than the poor people.
Much more than I thought.
Yeah, it's about as many as the poor people.
Different people, though.
Yeah, it was different people.
But, yeah, I don't think most people touch multisig in general.
Maybe I'm wrong because of the hands being raised here.
Or at least they don't use multisig in an intentional way.
In other words, you need it for lightning and things like this.
A lot of people do use multisig.
I'm not talking about lightning.
I'm talking about multisig savings.
But for self-storage, I've never used multisig, personally.
I probably shouldn't reveal that.
But, no, I've never used it.
I've never needed to.
You think it's overkill for the majority of people.
Yeah.
Well, the reason I wanted to see who raised their hands with multisig is I wanted to ask another question.
How many of you lost Bitcoin through using multisig?
Nobody yet.
Oh, one person.
I think they just don't want to admit it.
My point is just simply that you do have a little bit of a risk there where if you make a mistake or you lose a piece, you may do it.
But the same thing is true with one key, right?
So it's nuanced.
Okay.
Defend yourself, Jameson.
Yeah.
So multisig is strictly more complicated.
I mean, it's in the name, right?
You now have multiple keys that you're dealing with and managing.
And so the main thing that I would take away is that multisig is not panacea, right?
It really depends upon the details of the implementation.
And so because there is more complexity, if you're just jumping directly into multisig without doing the research, then there are more foot guns.
And I think one of the biggest foot guns that people don't understand with multisig is that keeping your wallet descriptor or basically the list of all of your public keys and derivation paths, that can become a single point of failure in and of itself.
Now, this is not private material, but it is necessary to be able to reconstruct your wallet and spin from it with a threshold of keys.
So it's safer to make many redundant copies of that data, but I think very few people do that.
And so that's probably one of the bigger risks.
One of the other risks is just taking the set it and forget it strategy.
I think a lot of people do think of their Bitcoin as their digital gold.
You buy it, you put it in cold storage, and you walk away for five or ten years.
And at Casa, we do not prescribe that.
And in fact, we prescribe regularly interacting with your keys, doing things that we call health checks, but basically proving on a regular basis that your key material still works, your hardware devices still work, especially if you're doing multivendor, multisig.
More complexity coming in there.
We've seen things like devices wiping themselves during firmware upgrades or screens dying.
There's any number of things that can go wrong, and so it becomes more important to just regularly check in on the health of your setup because it's more complicated.
Do you think for the average person, especially starting off, single-sig is fucking awesome?
Yes.
Yes.
Yeah.
Multi-sig is for institutional stuff, enterprise, like corporate treasuries, or for people who, maybe they're OGs, they have a large amount of their net worth.
But I think it also starts to make more sense if you have a large stack that you are saving for your children because you can do more interesting things on the inheritance side when you have multiple keys and you have more flexibility with what you can do with those keys.
Yeah, I think multi-sig becomes very interesting on the inheritance side.
That makes sense to me.
Gracefully degrading multi-sig.
Gracefully degrading multi-sig is something that we've been talking about for many years but has not become a standard.
So, you know, Bitcoin, in case you didn't know, is programmable money.
And we have not, we've only really begun to scratch the surface of what you can do with this programmable money,
but one of the cool things about it, especially with more recent scripting improvements and higher-level scripting languages like Miniscript,
is that you can create much more complex sets of spending conditions.
And so this gracefully degrading multi-sig is where you can set up your regular multi-sig and at the same time then have alternate spending paths.
So you could perhaps say, okay, if I haven't spent from my multi-sig in several years,
now decrease the threshold of keys that are required or even completely change the keys that are required.
You know, perhaps we change it to be keys that are held by some set of other semi-trusted parties that aren't even you.
This is where the flexibility becomes very powerful but, once again, even more complicated so you have to spend even more time thinking through how you're architecting it.
Felix, we didn't enter the Q&A period yet, so please control yourself. Thank you.
Can I can I say something about this point?
You can say whatever you want. It doesn't require permission.
Do you think that this already makes sense because we have, like, if you do, like, something with Miniscript and anything,
you have, like, this privacy implications right now that you have, like, this contract on-chain,
and this means that your addresses can easily be tied to you if, like, a chain analyst company have a look at the chain.
So do you think that makes, from a privacy perspective, already sense?
Well, Miniscript in and of itself, I don't believe makes Bitcoin's terrible privacy any worse than it already is.
And, in fact, you know, if you're doing something, like we were talking about, this degrading multi-sig where you have alternative spending pass,
the really cool thing about that is that it uses Taproot's Merkleized Abstract Syntax Tree,
which is a fancy way of saying you're actually not going to be revealing the alternative spending conditions.
You only reveal the spending conditions that you end up actually using.
So, but which hardware wallets did implement Taproot?
Yeah, so this is another one of the problems is that, like, we've had, we've had, you know, Taproot for, what, three years now?
And Miniscript has been theoretically possible, but the hardware vendors have been pretty slow to catch up.
So, I think Ledger supports it, maybe, I think CoinKite, yeah, Ledger supports Miniscript.
I mean, maybe it's only in the data.
Miniscript, yes, but not Taproot Miniscript.
So, like, I think the standard error in the right of multi-sig isn't supported yet from nearly any hardware wallets.
Coldcard does, but it's the edge firmware.
I think that's only in the beta.
Yeah, the edge firmware.
It's a Rob Hamilton firmware.
Yeah.
I mean, but also, none of this really matters, but yeah.
Yeah, so we have all this cool stuff at the protocol level, but, like, the rest of the ecosystem, the hardware and the software wallets generally don't support it.
So, it's just this cool theoretical thing that we're mostly...
I mean, the big, the big issue with, are we just going to grill Kasa?
Should this be the grill Kasa stage?
If we're going to grow, like, the big issue with privacy is that you're just trusting him with your privacy, right?
And they take it very seriously, and they deserve a lot of credit for that, but ultimately, you're trusting a company with your privacy to have your hand held.
Whenever you're doing a multi-party, multi-sig, yes.
There was...
We just had a new BIP come out that, once again, has some cool new theoretical stuff, but I expect it's going to be several years before we see these theoretical privacy improvements for, you know, call it collaborative multi-sig setups, matriculate out through the ecosystem and get supported by all the hardware and software.
Love it.
We got 10 minutes.
Let's do Q&A.
You guys have any good questions?
If you don't, then we'll not do Q&A.
Speak up, because you don't have a microphone.
Yeah, Joe, can we get a huge round of applause for Joe Nakamoto?
That's so well, right?
Thank you.
Yeah, I think Antonopoulos explained it, I think, five years ago on a video, why it's an extremely bad idea when it comes to cold storage and single-sig to split your seed phrase across maybe two, three bank vaults.
So, split it maybe 24 words into 12 words in this vault, 12 words in that vault.
Could you explain in a very simple manner why that's such a bad idea again?
Yeah, naively splitting a seed phrase can drastically reduce your protection against it being brute forced.
Thankfully, there is a very simple solution to this.
It's something called SeedZor.
And it's very easy to do that, especially if you have a cold card.
I don't know if any other hardware supports it.
But SeedZor basically allows you to securely split a seed phrase into two pieces.
And the cool thing is that each of those is a completely valid seed phrase in and of itself.
So, you have this additional level of plausible deniability.
So, you can have, think of it as like a two of two, even though this is not multi-sig, it's completely off-chain private.
But you end up with two valid seed phrases.
And you could even put a little bit of funds on each one and use that as a kind of canary in case, you know, someone, some adversary took it and they would get the funds off of it and think, oh, that was it.
But there's no way to know just from looking at the seed phrase that it's actually a part of a Zord seed phrase that needs, you know, some other piece to it.
So, highly recommend looking at a SeedZor.
And I would even buy, even if you don't like or don't want to use a cold card, I would buy a cold card solely to do SeedZor of seed phrases.
Can you spell that?
So, it's Seed X-O-R.
So, I mean, look, first of all, like if someone has part of your seed, they can use a computer to guess the rest of your seed.
That's the concern.
And then the second concern is don't trust bank faults.
Bank faults, they'll just drill into your bank fault.
The whole point of Bitcoin is that you don't trust bank faults.
If you have multi-sig, you can safely put a multi-sig key into a bank fault.
If they get the multi-sig key, you're not really that much worse off.
But do not put all your multi-sig keys into a bank fault.
And this, I think, goes to the crux of what Schwartz was saying earlier, which is like a lot of the problem with self-custody in general,
a lot of the difficulty with self-custody in general is it does require some nuance and personal responsibility.
So, there's no one-size-fits-all.
It's hard.
You have to actually like think through, like, what is my threat model?
Who am I protecting myself against?
You know, and how do I do that?
Do you want to respond?
Yeah, I wanted to like add something to Lop because he said that this thing was,
um, cold cut works, but I don't ever, I didn't ever heard of this yet, honestly.
So, um, most people that are asking like, why, why can I split the words?
I think, so why don't you just use a passphrase?
Because this is exactly done for, for this scenario that you have like, um, on the one hand, you have the seed phrase.
On the other hand, you have the passphrase.
And if someone, because probably you want to split your seed phrase because you, uh, fear that if someone gets access to it, then that he can steal the money.
And with the passphrase, you, um, like have a solution for this problem that if someone sees the seed phrase, he doesn't can access your Bitcoin and he needs to get a passphrase as well.
And then it's like having two separate, um, like, like half here, half here.
And you don't have, if you split it, like if you have 24 words and split it, then you don't have like what Lob said, that you have like two different words that are not, um, like individual words, sequences with invalid checksum.
Luca, please keep it short so we can do another question.
So, uh, I just wanted to add, uh, uh, two small things.
Uh, first one is that, uh, uh, I think that, uh, better solution compared to passphrase or the, well, passphrase have also a different use case, but also these other, uh, solution of splitting the, the backup into, uh, this has the fallback that it doesn't have redundancy.
So, uh, and this open, I think one of the biggest discussion topic here.
So, uh, first, uh, I think that compared to this, it would be better to use what is called, uh, Shamir secret sharing that given a single backup, uh, it allows you to have three different shards and you just need, uh, two of them to, to, to recover your funds.
Uh, and this way, like you can afford to lose one of them.
And the other one is that, uh, actually we, uh, talked before about like, uh, uh, shooting your foot in self custody.
And we are discussing like, uh, signature, uh, methods, single SIG, multi SIG, but I think that we should, uh, talk a bit also about like, uh, uh, backup management, because this is one of the hottest point here, because like, one of the greatest way to shoot in your foot is just to like, lose your backup.
Uh, and this is one like, uh, technology made a lot of improvement.
We talked about a mini script, mini type script, by the way, the beatbox supports both.
Uh, nice.
But, uh, not for more to see.
Okay.
I'm not sure about that.
Okay.
Uh, but it will soon two weeks, two weeks in two weeks.
They're going to ship support.
They're about to.
They're about to, yeah.
It's always two weeks.
It's too old of a reference.
Yeah.
And so the thing is that we added a lot of technology in, uh, like how we use our private keys.
But, uh, I think that, uh, we, we still need to think a lot about how we preserve our private keys.
Yeah.
I mean, I think that's a good point, Luca.
I think regardless, obviously, I think this answer has proved that you have many different options available to yourself, but please just keep, keep extra backups.
Just keep multiple backups.
Like majority of the time.
It's hard.
Like you're not going to have extra backups, but, uh, like you can add redundancy, but then it's also hard to keep all of them safe to check on them regularly.
Yeah, but they probably will not be stolen.
You're probably going to fuck.
You're going to probably lose your money.
You're probably lose your money by making a mistake.
So extra backups is just a very, for most people, especially if you're not a public person, if you're not an organization, keep multiple backups, keep them in multiple places.
Your house burns down.
You're good.
Everything's good.
You know, sure.
With the, like how things works today.
That's probably the best advice.
And putting them still ideally.
Okay.
Next question.
And this is definitely going to be the last question because we are very long-winded answers.
It's a nice, hard question to answer in a short way.
So you're welcome.
Uh, inheritance is something that I think is often overlooked, but Bitcoin is starting to become something.
It's not just like young single people.
It's people with families, people with wives who aren't technical, that sort of thing.
How do you actually factor in this idea of how, how can this Bitcoin be recovered if I get hit by a bus into the equation of what solution could I use?
Because I think a lot of people, like I'm very technical.
I could do a very complex mini script multi-sig setup.
I could do something that's very difficult to recover that I could easily recover.
But I know that if I get hit by a bus, my wife is never going to recover that.
So like, how do you factor that into your decision making for the individual of what can I do and get away with?
And then what can I make sure also that my loved ones can recover if I die or I'm incapacitated or something like that?
I mean, I can answer, but any of these guys could probably answer better.
There are services, probably Kevin Loak from Liana should be up here, not me.
And his wallet actually provides inheritance services.
And you can do this with time locks.
What's that?
I know what his wallet is, but did you say what his wallet is?
I said Liana, right?
Oh, okay.
Yeah.
Sorry.
But you can do this in a way that involves, you know, people that help you with multi-sig and these services like Kaza has.
And I think even Liana has services as well.
Or you can do this in a way with just time locks that's just automatic with like dead man switches, things like this.
So there are like noob safe inheritance methods.
I mean, I like, yeah, I mean, you can use Kaza, use Ref Link, Odell, I get 15% of your money.
No, I don't, we don't have a Ref Link yet, but can you enable that?
Absolutely.
You can use services like Kaza, Liana.
I mean, I don't know if Liana has a service, but their mini script is pretty dope.
You can set it up.
I will.
Yeah.
And Nunchuck has a service, Anchor Watch has a service.
But also like, just think about it, think about it in your current situation, right?
And so pretend you get hit by a bus and think about what happens next.
And I think if you have at least two pieces, it makes it a lot easier.
So I think Schwartz made a good point with passphrases.
I think passphrases can be used here very well.
I think multi-sig is particularly well suited for it.
But what I tell people at least is, I mean, if you do a simple multi-sig, you do a two or
three multi-sig and your heir gets a multi, your heir gets one key.
So they can't spend it on their own.
And then you give a lawyer a second key, then you have a pretty foolproof inheritance situation.
And this is important, by the way, like you can trust your wife and you should trust your wife.
If you don't trust your wife, you probably messed up.
This is like literally producing children.
It's like insane if you don't trust her, but you don't want her to be a part of your threat model.
Like you don't want someone to be able to put a gun to her head and be like, give me the Bitcoin.
Right?
So if you give her one key, if you give the heir one key, you give a lawyer one key, then they can come together.
God forbid something happens to you and then they can spend it.
Now the really dark part of inheritance.
And I don't know if Jameson, if you've thought about, you probably think about this stuff all the freaking time.
Is if both, if, if, if both the parentals die, like you're in a, so how can you comment on how you think about this?
Yeah.
Yeah.
So once again, it comes down to levels of redundancy, but more redundancy also means more complexity.
So, you know, we, we make it pretty easy to have an inheritance set up.
But then if you want to add additional beneficiaries, that's where it just comes down to sharing more keys, at least within CASA with multi-sig.
And so you then have to think through, okay, what if this person dies?
What if all of these people die?
Like where are the threshold of keys in this extreme situation?
So unfortunately this gets comp, more and more complicated.
Um, if you're going to roll your own inheritance set up, I would highly recommend, um, reading Pamela Morgan's crypto asset inheritance planning book.
This is a thick book on Amazon that will help you think through a lot of these edge cases, not just the technical, but also the legal and the game theory.
Otherwise you should probably go and look at some of the services that specifically have inheritance set up.
Because I would say one of the most important things that we do at CASA is actually not let you do a lot of things.
Like we intentionally prevent you from doing a lot of things to keep it as simple as possible.
Okay. I love this. Uh, guys, we're over time.
Final thoughts, Luca, uh, Bitcoin self custody.
Uh, don't scare the people.
What?
Just bring it back. Just bring it back.
Final thoughts, Bitcoin self custody.
Take your money off exchanges.
Keep it simple. Keep it simple, guys.
Keep it simple and have a lot of backups.
I love it. Schnortz, final thoughts.
So if you have like too many backups, then consider to have a passphrase because
then every backup you have could be like, if it gets stolen, then your Bitcoin are gone as well.
So if you have too many backups, then you should, if you want to increase your security further,
you should consider take a passphrase or a multisig.
Love it. Final thoughts, Jameson.
I would say the main thing is this is not an all or nothing thing.
You can take graduated steps.
The most important thing is that you just keep improving over time.
And I think the easiest way to look at it is take the value of your Bitcoin,
multiply it by 10 and ask yourself, is my security set up good enough for when it's 10 times as valuable as it is today.
Great thoughts. Final thoughts, John.
In the end, not your keys, not your coins.
So if any of this sounds interesting to you and you feel like you should be securing your coins differently,
then research all of this more and find what fits for you.
Please don't get overwhelmed.
Learn how to self custody your Bitcoin.
It's easier than you think.
Thank you all for joining us.
Have a great night. Cheers.
Thank you so much, gentlemen.
No one looks afraid.
No one looks scared.
Fantastic.
You're all now well-versed in the various flavors of Bitcoin self custody.